Buffalo Law Review
Volume 63

Number 2

Article 8

4-1-2015

ACLU v. Clapper: The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age
Erin E. Connare
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erin E. Connare, ACLU v. Clapper: The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 395 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol63/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

NOTE

ACLU v. Clapper: The Fourth Amendment
in the Digital Age
ERIN E. CONNARE†
INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian
published the first of several leaks of classified information
regarding the United States Government’s intelligence
surveillance and collection programs.1 A classified document,
provided by former National Security Agency (“NSA”)
contract employee and whistleblower Edward Snowden,2
revealed a Secondary Order issued by Judge Roger Vinson of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) on April
25, 2013.3 The FISC order, set to expire on July 19, 2013,
compelled Verizon Business Network Services (“Verizon”) to
† Executive Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015,
SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A. in Psychology and Social Sciences, SUNY at
Buffalo. Very special thanks to my editor, Paul Bartlett, Ryan Ganzenmuller, and
the members of the Buffalo Law Review for all of their hard work in readying my
Note for publication. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their undying
love and support, without which I would not be where I am today.
1. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
2. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden:
The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN
(June
11,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edwardsnowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance.
3. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Secondary Order, BR 13-80 (FISA Ct.
Apr. 25, 2013).

395

396

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

“produce . . . and continue production on an ongoing daily
basis . . . all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’
created by Verizon for communications (i) between the
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United
States, including local telephone calls.”4 The order further
provided that “no person shall disclose to any other person
that the FBI or NSA has sought or obtained tangible things
under this Order.”5 In response to The Guardian’s
unauthorized disclosure, the U.S. Government confirmed the
existence of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection
Program (“the Program”).6 Shortly thereafter, The Guardian
published additional information regarding secret NSA
surveillance programs, including revealing the Internet datacollection program PRISM7 and the data-mining tool
Boundless Informant.8
These public revelations have led to the filing of several
lawsuits.9 This Note assesses ACLU v. Clapper, an action
brought before the District Court for the Southern District of
New York and decided by Judge William H. Pauley III on
December 27, 2013.10 In Clapper, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and
the New York Civil Liberties Foundation brought suit
against several Executive Branch department and agency
4. Id. at 1-2. (omission added).
5. Id. at 2.
6. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Aug. 9, 2013), available
at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
7. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
8. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The NSA’s
Secret Tool to Track Global Surveillance Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-globaldatamining.
9. See, e.g., In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013); Klayman v.
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
10. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
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heads—Director of National Intelligence James Clapper,
NSA Director and Central Security Service Chief Keith
Alexander, Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel, Attorney
General Eric Holder, and FBI Director James Comey. 11
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that: (1) the
Program exceeded the statutory authority granted by Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act; and (2) the Program violated the
First and Fourth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.12 In addition, Plaintiffs sought a permanent
injunction enjoining the Government from continuing
collection of their telephony metadata.13 After an extremely
in-depth analysis of the issues presented, Judge Pauley
rejected Plaintiffs’ claims and granted the Government’s
motion to dismiss.14
I. THE NSA’S BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION
PROGRAM
To fully comprehend Judge Pauley’s ruling, it is
important to understand just what exactly the Bulk
Telephony Metadata Collection Program is and what it does.
The Program’s central purpose is terrorism prevention.15 The
Program operates under the “business records” provision of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).16 The
business records provision of FISA allows the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), or an authorized
designee of the Director, to apply to the FISC for
an order requiring the production of any “tangible things” for an
investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or to protect against
11. Id. at 730.
12. Id. at 735.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 757.
15. Declaration of Teresa H. Shea, Signals Intelligence Director, National
Security Agency ¶ 44, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No.
13-cv-3994) [hereinafter Shea Declaration].
16. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012). This provision of FISA was enacted by
Section 215 of the Patriot Act. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272.
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international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
provided that such investigation of a United States person is not
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the Constitution.17

These applications must include both “a statement of facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation,” and “an enumeration of the minimization
procedures” in place.18
Since May 2006, the FBI has used Section 215 to obtain
FISC orders directing designated telecommunications
service providers to produce all business records created that
contain information about communications between
telephone identifiers relating to telephone calls made
between the United States and a foreign country and those
wholly within the United States.19 The NSA collects preexisting business records of the telecommunications
providers, and does not itself create or record any of the
information.20 Since May 2006, at least fifteen different FISC
judges have entered at least thirty-five such orders
authorizing the NSA’s bulk collection of telephony
metadata.21 The telephony metadata that FISC orders
authorize the Government to collect include the telephone
numbers that placed and received the call, other sessionidentifying information, trunk identifier, telephone calling
card number, and the date, time, and duration of the call.22
The FISC orders do not authorize the Government to collect
the content of any call, nor the cell site locational
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012) (alterations added) (emphasis added).
18. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A)-(B).
19. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 734; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1314.
20. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 18.
21. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Primary Order, BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25,
2013) [hereinafter Primary Order]; Declaration of Acting Assistant Director
Robert J. Holley, Federal Bureau of Investigation ¶ 11, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-cv-3994) [hereinafter Holley Declaration];
Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 14.
22. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 15.
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information, names, addresses, or financial information of
any parties to any call.23
After receiving telephony metadata information from
telecommunications providers, the NSA compiles and stores
the information in one database under “carefully controlled
circumstances” and may keep the information for up to five
years.24 The NSA may access the stored telephony metadata
only through queries using metadata identifiers.25 An
identifier used to commence a query, called a “seed,” must be
approved by any of twenty-two designated officials.26 To
approve a seed, one of the approving officials must determine
that “based on the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,
there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion (RAS) that the selection term to be queried” is in
association with an international terrorist organization
subject to an FBI investigation, but that association cannot
be solely based on activities protected under the First
Amendment.27
Analysis is not limited strictly to the approved identifier,
but also extends to second- and third-tier contacts of the
identifier, known as “hops.”28 The identifiers directly in
contact with the seed identifier are contained in the first hop,
those identifiers in direct contact with the first hop
identifiers comprise the second hop, and those identifiers in
direct contact with the second hop constitute the third hop. 29
NSA officials analyze this information to see which results

23. Id.
24. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 14; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶¶
16, 23, 30.
25. A common example of an identifier is a telephone number that is associated
with a foreign terrorist organization. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 19.
26. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 7; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 20.
27. Primary Order, supra note 21, at 7. “The RAS requirement ensures an
ordered and controlled querying of the collected data” and is intended “to prevent
any general browsing of [such] data.” Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 20.
28. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 22.
29. Id.
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are likely to be of investigative value to the FBI. 30 While
extremely high volumes of data are collected pursuant to the
Program, only a small percentage is reviewed by analysts.31
If the FBI chooses to investigate a telephone number tipped
to it through the Program, “the FBI must rely on publicly
available information, other available intelligence, or other
legal processes in order to identify the subscribers of any of
the numbers that are retrieved.”32
In accordance with Section 215, there are several
minimization procedures in place to help control the
Program.33 First, the NSA stores and processes the metadata
in repositories within secure networks, and access is
permitted only for purposes allowed under the FISC’s order. 34
Second, stored “metadata must be destroyed no later than
five years after [its] initial collection.”35 Third, as previously
noted, no one other than any of twenty-two designated
officials “can make findings of RAS that a proposed seed
identifier is associated with a specified terrorist
organization.”36 And, for identifiers associated with United
States persons, it must also be determined that the RAS
finding “is not based solely on activities protected by the First
30. Id. ¶ 26.
31. Id. ¶ 5. In 2012, for example, “fewer than 300” unique identifiers met the
RAS standard and were used as seeds to query data. Id. ¶ 24. While the number
of metadata records responsive to these queries is not known, due to the threetiered “hop” analysis, the number is “substantially larger than 300,” but is still a
very small percentage of the total metadata collected. Id.
32. WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 4. An example provided in the White Paper
is of the FBI’s use of
a grand jury subpoena to a telephone company to obtain subscriber
information for a telephone number. If . . . the FBI were able to develop
probable cause to believe [the number] was being used by an agent of a
foreign terrorist organization, the FBI could [then] apply to the FISC for
an order under Title 1 of FISA to authorize interception of the contents
of future communications to and from that telephone number.
Id. (alterations and omission added).
33. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (2012).
34. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 30.
35. WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 5; Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 30.
36. Shea Declaration, supra note 15, ¶ 31 (emphasis added).
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Amendment.”37 Fourth, “no [query] results may be
disseminated outside of the NSA except in accordance with
the minimization and dissemination requirements and
established NSA procedures.”38 Prior to the dissemination of
any United States person’s information, one of a few highranking NSA officials “must determine that the information
is in fact related to counterterrorism information, and is
necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
assess its importance.”39 Fifth, the NSA uses “stringent and
mutually reinforcing technological and personnel training
measures to ensure that queries will be made only as to
identifiers about which RAS has been established.”40 Sixth,
the program is subject to both internal and external
oversight.41 Compliance issues identified by any of the
overseeing parties are reported to the FISC, and significant
compliance issues are reported to the Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress. 42 Despite
the various controls in effect, the Government has
acknowledged and responded to compliance and
implementation incidents that have taken place since the
program’s inception.43
II. ACLU V. CLAPPER
In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley opened his opinion
with a brief recollection of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, focusing
on calls made by 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to an alQaeda safe house in Yemen that were intercepted by the
37. Id.
38. Id. ¶ 32.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. ¶ 33. “Intelligence analysts receive comprehensive training on the
minimization procedures applicable to the use, handling, and dissemination of
the metadata, and technical controls that prevent NSA intelligence analysts from
seeing any metadata unless as the result of a query using an approved identifier.”
Id.
41. Id. ¶ 34. For example, the Program is monitored by the Department of
Justice, FISC, and Congress. Id.
42. Id. ¶ 35.
43. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 6.
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NSA.44 Judge Pauley went on to state that the intelligence
used by the NSA did not capture Mihdhar’s telephone
number identifier, and as a result, the NSA mistakenly
concluded Mihdhar was outside the United States. 45
“Learn[ing] from its mistake,” the Government launched new
intelligence counter-measures, including the Program. 46
Judge Pauley called the Program a “blunt tool,” one that
“only works because it collects everything” and that could
“imperil[ ] the civil liberties of every citizen” if it was
unrestrained.47 According to Judge Pauley, the Program,
despite highlighting the “natural tension between protecting
the nation and preserving civil liberty,” was lawful.48
Before launching into his discussion of the Program,
Judge Pauley first discussed the Program’s relevant
background. Judge Pauley discussed the enactment of FISA
in 1978 and its subsequent expansion by Section 215 of the
USA Patriot Act in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.49 He commented on the “extensive oversight” the
Program is subjected to, the steps the Government must take
to obtain judicial approval for its collection under the
Program, and the reporting requirements the Government
owes to the intelligence committees of the House and
Senate.50 The opinion also addressed the various compliance
issues regarding the Program, but concluded the NSA
reported the issues to the FISC and Congress and had since
“addressed these problems.”51
The first issue the court addressed in Clapper was
whether Plaintiffs had standing to sue.52 The requirement
that plaintiffs first establish their standing to sue comes from
44. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 729-30.
47. Id. at 730.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 731-32.
50. Id. at 732.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 735-36.
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the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution.53 Article III standing requires
that an injury be “concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged
action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”54 Plaintiffs
alleged injury in the Government’s collection of their
telephony metadata, the search of the collected metadata
resulting from any query by the NSA, and the chilling effect
on the ACLU’s potential and current clients who will not
contact the ACLU because of the Government’s collection. 55
The Government, in opposition, relied on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International56
and argued that none of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries met the
requirements of Article III. 57 Judge Pauley, agreeing with
Plaintiffs that they satisfied the standing requirement,
distinguished Amnesty International. Unlike Amnesty
International, which was decided before the Program was
revealed,58 there was “no dispute” that the Government
collected Plaintiffs’ telephony metadata, thus constituting
actual injury.59
The court then addressed Plaintiffs’ statutory claims. In
particular, Plaintiffs claimed that the NSA exceeded its
authority under FISA’s “tangible things” provision in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 60

53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
54. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
55. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
56. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (holding plaintiffs’ “highly speculative fear”
that their communications would be intercepted was based on a “highly
attenuated chain of possibilities” and thus insufficient to show the immanency
required to establish injury in fact).
57. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
58. Amnesty International was decided on February 26, 2013, over three
months before the first revelations about the NSA’s Program. See Amnesty Int’l,
133 S. Ct. at 1138; supra Introduction.
59. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
60. Id. at 738-42. Section 706 of the APA provides, in relevant part, that a
reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
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Pursuant to Section 702 of the APA, a person “suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” is permitted to sue the United
States for “relief other than money damages.”61 However, this
waiver of sovereign immunity62 can be overcome where
“congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly
discernible in the statutory scheme.’”63 Congressional intent
can be determined by examining specific language, specific
legislative history, or inferences of intent drawn from the
statutory scheme as a whole.64
Judge Pauley, examining the USA Patriot Act and FISA’s
overall statutory scheme, concluded that “Congress withdrew
the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for section 215.”65
Congress’s concern, noted Judge Pauley, was to provide
redress for policy violations in cases where the Government
took steps to generate evidence, but not where the
Government obtained evidence created solely in the ordinary
course of business of a third party.66 Even under Section 701
of the APA, which withdraws sovereign immunity “to the
extent [the relevant] statutes preclude judicial review,”67
Judge Pauley found support in FISA’s statutory scheme that
“section 215 does not provide for any person other than a
recipient of an order to challenge the orders’ legality or
otherwise participate in the process,” and to hold otherwise
would “undermine the Government’s vital interest” in the
secrecy of the Program. 68
conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
62. “The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it
unequivocally consents to be sued.” Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (citing United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).
63. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
64. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting Block, 467 U.S. at 349).
65. Id. at 740.
66. Id.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
68. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (citation omitted). Even more than
undermining a vital Government interest, Judge Pauley would consider it absurd
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Even though it decided Plaintiffs’ statutory claims were
precluded, the court assessed the merits of the claims. When
seeking a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must establish
four things: that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of a preliminary injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips in
their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.69
The court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of their statutory claim. 70
The court addressed Plaintiffs’ contentions that Section 215
needed to be interpreted narrowly to avoid conflict with the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), that collection under
the Program was overbroad because it covered voluminous
amounts of irrelevant data, and whether Congress ratified
the Government’s interpretation of Section 215.71
On the first matter, the court held that harmony between
the SCA and Section 215 existed if the SCA was read to allow
the collection of telephony metadata through Section 215
orders.72 The SCA allows communication providers to divulge
subscribers’ records to government entities if the government
obtains a warrant, an administrative subpoena, a grand jury
or trial subpoena, an order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, or
a national security letter.73 However, the records sought must
always be “relevant” to an authorized investigation of
international terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities. 74
Section 215, in similar fashion, permits the government to
require the production of “tangible things” so long as the
Government provides facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things sought are
“relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation.75 These
if the “lawbreaking conduct by a government contractor that reveals state
secrets . . . could frustrate Congress’s intent.” Id. at 742.
69. Id. (quoting Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 742-49.
72. Id. at 743.
73. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
74. See id. § 2709(b)(1).
75. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
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Section 215 orders, according to the court, are “functionally
equivalent to grand jury subpoenas,” and thus allowing such
orders to be obtained is in harmony with the SCA.76
On the second matter—whether the Program was
overbroad—the court employed a highly deferential stance in
the Government’s favor.77 Tangible items are relevant,
according to the court, if they bear on or could reasonably
lead to other matter that could bear on the investigation. 78
The Program required the collection of “virtually all”
telephony metadata in order to be comprehensive.79 Since
there was no way for the Government to know in advance
what telephony metadata might lead to counterterrorism
information, aggregated collections of the information was
necessary.80 The court concluded that telephony metadata, as
a category, was relevant and thus not overbroad as Plaintiffs
alleged.81
On the third matter, the court found that Congress had
ratified the Government’s interpretation of Section 215.
Congress is presumed to be aware of a statute’s
interpretation, and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.82 On a semi-annual basis,
the Government must provide reports to the House and
Senate intelligence and judiciary committees that include a
summary of any significant FISC interpretations involving
Section 215 matters and any FISC documents including
significant constructions or interpretations of Section 215.83
In 2010, the court noted, the Executive Branch produced a
classified five-page document discussing the Program that
was made available to the entire body of Congress. 84 An
76. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
77. Id. at 747.
78. Id. at 746.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 747.
81. Id. at 748.
82. Id. at 743-44 (quoting Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239-40
(2009)).
83. See id. at 744 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (2012)).
84. Id. at 744.
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updated version of this document was made available again
to the entire body of Congress in 2011.85 In both 2010 and
2011, after the documents were made available, Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change.86 This, according to
the court, showed that Congress ratified the Executive’s
interpretation of Section 215.87
Despite finding that it could not hear Plaintiffs’ statutory
claims, the court was not precluded from addressing their
constitutional claims.88 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim
was grounded in the idea that the Program’s long-term
recording and aggregation of telephony metadata invaded
their reasonable expectation of privacy and thus constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment.89 Plaintiffs concluded
that this search violated the Fourth Amendment because it
was warrantless and lacked any indicia of reasonableness.90
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim alleged that the Program
violated their rights to private association and free speech. 91
The Program, according to Plaintiffs, “chill[ed]” their
associational and expressive freedoms and exposed all of
their (often-sensitive) contacts to Government monitoring.92
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
argument. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”93 A
search occurs under the Fourth Amendment when the
Government violates a “subjective expectation of privacy that

85. Id. at 745.
86. Id. at 744.
87. Id. at 745.
88. Id. at 749.
89. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss at 26-29, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 13-cv-3994).
90. See id. at 26-35.
91. See id. at 35.
92. See id. at 35-40.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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society recognizes as reasonable.”94 Thus, the threshold
Fourth Amendment question faced in Clapper was whether
telephone subscribers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their telephony metadata. 95 If the answer to this
question was yes, a Fourth Amendment search occurred, and
the inquiry turns to whether the individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to
recognize as reasonable.96
The main focus of the court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis was the 1979 Supreme Court case Smith v.
Maryland.97 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that
telephone subscribers have “no legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the numbers they dial.98 Telephone customers,
Smith held, have no subjective expectation of privacy because
they knowingly “convey numerical information to the phone
company . . . [knowing] the phone company has facilities for
recording this information . . . and [knowing] the phone
company does in fact record this information for . . . business
purposes.”99 Even if a telephone user did have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed, continued the
Court, this expectation was “not ‘one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable,’” because there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over
to third parties.100
Judge Pauley rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the
Program allowed the “creation of a rich mosaic” that revealed
deeply personal and intimate aspects of a person’s life.101
94. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
95. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
96. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50.
98. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
99. Id. (alterations and omissions added).
100. Id. at 743-44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
101. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged the
Program could “reveal a person’s religion, political associations, use of a
telephone-sex hotline, contemplation of suicide, addiction to gambling or drugs,
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Judge Pauley pointed out that the NSA could not query the
telephony metadata without additional legal justification,
the information obtained when queries were performed only
extended three hops from the identifier, and the NSA could
not tell who the identifiers belonged to.102 Judge Pauley also
dismissed Plaintiffs’ contentions that the Government could
perform its three-hop analysis without building an
aggregated
database
as
“judicial-Monday-morningquarterbacking.”103 Such after-the-fact evaluations were
dangerous, according to the court, and there is no
requirement that only the “least intrusive” searches are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.104
Another problem the court had with Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment
argument
was
their
“fundamental
misapprehension” about ownership of the telephony
metadata. The “tangible things” obtained by the FISC
orders—the business records—were not Plaintiffs’ records,
but Verizon’s records.105 This distinction was important for
the court, because it triggered the third-party doctrine, 106
under which a person forfeits his right to privacy in
information voluntarily conveyed to third parties. 107
Additionally, since the records belong to Verizon—and not
Plaintiffs—their subsequent querying did not implicate any
Fourth Amendment interest of Plaintiffs.108
Finally, the court examined Plaintiffs’ reliance on a
recent case, United States v. Jones,109 in the context of Smith
v. Maryland. In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a search
occurred where a GPS tracking device was attached, without
a warrant, to a suspect’s car and monitored for twenty-eight
experience with rape, grappling with sexuality, or support for particular political
causes.” Id.
102. Id. at 750-51.
103. Id. at 751.
104. Id. (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010)).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
107. Id. at 742-43.
108. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
109. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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days.110 The Court held that this constituted a search because
it was a physical intrusion for the purpose of obtaining
information.111 Two concurring opinions, authored by Justices
Alito and Sotomayor, found the surveillance also constituted
a search because it invaded reasonable expectations of
privacy.112 Plaintiffs contended the search in Clapper was the
same kind of search—if not more intrusive—as that
considered by the concurring Justices, and that the court
should follow the reasoning of the Jones concurrences, not
Smith’s.113
In response to this argument, however, Judge Pauley
pointed to the fact that Jones did not overrule Smith. If
Supreme Court precedent has direct application to a case,
even where it “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions,” inferior courts “should follow the case
which directly controls” and “leav[e] to [the Supreme] Court
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”114 The
Program does not violate the Fourth Amendment, Judge
Pauley held, because Smith, as “[c]lear precedent,” held that
a telephone “subscriber has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in telephony metadata created by third parties.”115
This result is not changed by the ubiquity of cell phones or
the different relationship that exists between persons and
their phones now as opposed to when Smith was decided.116
The increase in the number of calls made and the versatility
and multiple uses of cell phones do not change this result. 117
110. Id. at 948-49.
111. Id. at 949.
112. Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (finding individuals have a
“reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of [their] public
movements” that is violated by continuous GPS monitoring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
113. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 89, at 27-29.
114. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (alterations added); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
115. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Most importantly, Judge Pauley acknowledged, “what
metadata is has not changed over time . . . [a]s in Smith, the
types of information at issue in this case are relatively
limited: [tele]phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the
like.”118 Since he found no search occurred, Judge Pauley did
not address the question of reasonableness.119
Having concluded that no Fourth Amendment search
occurred, Judge Pauley turned to address Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claim.120 Plaintiffs alleged that the Program
violated the First Amendment because it was likely to have
a “chilling effect” on individuals who would otherwise contact
them.121 The court, once again, rejected Plaintiffs’ argument.
First, the court agreed with the Government’s position that
“surveillance
consistent
with
Fourth
Amendment
protections . . . does not violate First Amendment rights, even
though it may be directed at communicative or associative
activities.”122 The court further concluded that Clapper v.
Amnesty International compelled the conclusion that the
Program did not substantially burden First Amendment
rights.123 Like in Amnesty International, Plaintiffs’
speculative “[f]ear that telephony metadata” would be
queried “relie[d] on a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities.”124 This fear was insufficient to establish a
violation of First Amendment rights.125
The court thus concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a
claim and that their case must be dismissed. Before finishing
118. Id. (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2014))
(emphasis and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 749-52.
120. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
122. Id. (quoting Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 n.3
(6th Cir. 1983)) (omission in original).
123. Id. at 753-54.
124. Id. at 754 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2012))
(alterations added).
125. Id.
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his opinion, however, Judge Pauley engaged in a balancing of
the equities and public interest to show that, even if Plaintiffs
could show a likelihood of success on the merits, a
preliminary injunction would still be inappropriate. The
Government’s interest in combating terrorism, he held,
seriously outweighed any privacy interest Plaintiffs could
point to, and “proper deference” was owed to the Government
on the subject of national security.126 While it was restricted
on the information it could share, the Government offered
illustrations of three situations in which the Program
allegedly helped combat terrorism. 127 Judge Pauley found
“ample justification” in these three examples, concluding the
“effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot
be seriously disputed.”128
In the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Pauley returned
to where he started: the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By its own
design, he noted, the Program “vacuums up” mass quantities
of information so the Government can detect terrorist
relationships and avoid tragic results like the 9/11 attacks. 129
The court’s role was to “reject as false, claims in the name of
civil liberty,” like those brought by Plaintiffs, that would
“paralyze or impair [the Government’s] authority” to protect
the nation.130 The bigger danger to civil liberties, proffered
Judge Pauley, was the success of a terrorist attack on
American soil.131 Thus, he concluded the Program was lawful
and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.132

126. Id.
127. Holley Declaration, supra note 21, ¶¶ 24-26. For example, the NSA,
through the Program, gave information to the FBI about an individual in Kansas
City with ties to an overseas al-Qaeda extremist. Working off this tip, the FBI
discovered a previously unknown plot to attack the New York Stock Exchange
and identified and arrested several individuals involved. Id. ¶ 24.
128. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
129. Id. at 757.
130. Id. (alteration added).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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III. KLAYMAN V. OBAMA
On January 2, 2014, the ACLU filed its notice of appeal
to the Second Circuit.133 On appeal, the most contested issue
is likely to be whether the Program violates the Fourth
Amendment. Despite Judge Pauley’s ruling that the Program
does not constitute a search under, and thus does not
constitute a violation of, the Fourth Amendment, this view is
not universally accepted. In fact, only eleven days before
Clapper was decided, a case in the District Court of the
District of Colombia, Klayman v. Obama, yielded a
conflicting result.134 As it did in Clapper, the Government
relied on Smith v. Maryland, contending that no one has an
expectation of privacy in the telephony metadata that
telephone providers hold as business records.135 Judge Leon,
presiding over the case, concluded not only that the Program
constituted a search that was likely unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, but also that Smith could not
adequately guide his decision.136
In fact, Judge Leon found the question he faced in
Klayman to be a “far cry” from the question presented in
Smith thirty-four years prior.137 The question for Judge Leon
was not “whether the installation and use of a pen register
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,” but “when do present-day circumstances—the
evolutions in the Government’s surveillance capabilities,
citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA
and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those
considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that

133. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, No. 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2013), appeal filed, Notice of Appeal, No. 13-cv-3994 (2d Cir. Jan. 2, 2014).
134. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
135. See, e.g., Government Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Preliminary Injunctions at 46-47, Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013) (Nos. 1:13-cv-0851, 1:13-cv-0881).
136. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32-37.
137. Id. at 31.
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a precedent like Smith simply does not apply?”138 Judge Leon
answered: “now.”139
According to Judge Leon, the Government’s present-day
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the
NSA’s relationship with telecommunication companies had
become “so thoroughly unlike” the situation faced in Smith
that Smith’s precedent could no longer apply.140 First,
whereas the pen register used in Smith were in use “for only
a matter of days,”141 and there was no expectation that the
records obtained through it would be retained after the
investigation’s finish, the NSA’s program involved the
creation of a historical database containing five years’ worth
of metadata and was potentially endless.142
Second, the relationship between the police and the
phone company in Smith and the relationship between the
NSA and telecom companies in the present case were vastly
different. Whereas the phone company in Smith installed an
individual pen register at the police’s request, telecom
companies, pursuant to FISC orders, must turn over call
detail records to the NSA “on a daily basis,” with order
renewals happening frequently over several years.143 For
Judge Leon, this “formalized policy” permitting the “daily,
all-encompassing, indiscriminate dump” of telephony
metadata to the NSA went far beyond the individualized
request for data seen in Smith.144 The “almost-Orwellian”
technology at issue in Klayman was “at best . . . the stuff of
science fiction” when Smith was decided.145
Most importantly for Judge Leon was the vast difference
in peoples’ usage of and relationships with their personal
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 32.
142. “[T]here is the very real prospect that the program will go on for as long as
America is combating terrorism, which realistically could be forever!” Id.
143. Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 33.
145. Id. (omission added).
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phones between 1979 and the present-day.146 While conceding
that what metadata is has not changed since 1979, Judge
Leon found that the nature and quantity of the information
contained in telephony metadata is much greater now than
it was in 1979.147 In addition to the drastic increase in the
ubiquity of mobile phones, their use has drastically
transformed as well, with mobile phones most often used as
“multi-purpose devices.”148 According to Judge Leon, due to
our now “phone-centric culture,” telephony metadata has the
potential to reveal “‘a wealth of detail about [a person’s]
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations’149 . . . an entire mosaic—a vibrant and
constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”150 These
“trends,” Judge Leon proposed, have led to “greater
expectation[s] of privacy and a recognition that society views
[those] expectation[s] as reasonable.”151 In light of these
Fourth Amendment violations, Judge Leon granted the
Klayman plaintiffs’ requests for a preliminary injunction, but
stayed his order pending appeal.152 On January 3, 2014, the
Government filed its notice of appeal to the Circuit Court for
the District of Colombia.153
IV. CLAPPER VERSUS KLAYMAN: WHO WAS RIGHT?
The conflicting opinions of Clapper and Klayman pose
interesting questions. On appeal, should the Second Circuit
adhere to Judge Pauley’s reasoning on the Fourth
Amendment issue and affirm, or should it adopt the
146. Id. at 33-34.
147. Id. at 34-35.
148. Id. at 34 (“They are now maps and music players. . . . [t]hey are
cameras. . . . [t]hey are even lighters people hold up at rock concerts.”).
149. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (alteration added).
150. Id.
151. Id. (alterations added) (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 9-10.
153. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, Nos. 1:13-cv-00851, 1:13-cv-00881
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013), appeal filed, Government Defendants’ Notice of Appeal,
Nos. 1:13-cv-00851, 1:13-cv-00881 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 3, 2014).
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reasoning of Judge Leon? The answer is not clear-cut, but the
argument weighs in Judge Pauley’s favor. Even so, the
concerns echoed in Klayman must not be ignored.
As articulated by Judge Pauley, Supreme Court
precedent binds inferior courts.154 If Supreme Court
precedent has direct application to a case, even where it
“appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions,” inferior courts should follow the controlling
case.155 Since the information obtained through the Program
is the same information obtained in Smith, its application is
clear: the NSA’s collection of telephony metadata is “squarely
controlled” by Smith.156 Like a pen register, the Program does
not obtain the contents of communications or locational
information.157 The Program merely obtains the telephone
numbers that have been dialed, when the call occurred, and
the length of the call.158
Some, like the Klayman and Clapper plaintiffs, seem to
suggest that Smith’s holding has been eroded by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones.159 However,
the Program does not present the same issue as that
addressed in Jones. Jones considered the constitutionality of
attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle and monitoring
the vehicle’s movement over a twenty-eight-day period.160 The
Court unanimously agreed this constituted a search, but the
majority concluded only on the basis that this was a physical
trespass.161 The Jones Court declined to address the question
154. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
155. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (alterations added); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
156. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 13-109, at 6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
157. But see Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011) (arguing that
cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone
location data under the Fourth Amendment).
158. See supra Part I.
159. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 89, at 27-29.
160. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-49 (2012).
161. Id. at 949-50.
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of whether such long-term tracking would constitute a search
absent physical trespass.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor opined that
long term monitoring infringes upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Long-term monitoring,
she said, “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”162 While the Jones concurrences
appeared to suggest changing technologies might lead to
increased expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment,163 this suggestion neither controlled the court
nor undermined Smith. Smith has still not been eroded with
respect to numbers dialed, and has in fact been extended to
a degree.164
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor also criticized the
third-party doctrine as “ill suited [sic] to the digital age.”165
Despite facing criticism, the third-party doctrine—one of the
key underpinnings of Smith—has not been discarded.166 The
principle that individuals who voluntarily disclose
information to third parties lose Fourth Amendment
protection, as echoed in Smith, stands firm. Just as in 1979,
telephone subscribers voluntarily disclose the numbers they
dial to their telephone companies. Just as in 1979, telephone
162. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
163. See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that individuals have
a “reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of [their] public
movements” that is violated by continuous GPS monitoring) (alteration added);
id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy”).
164. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding,
in light of Smith, that e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in
the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the website they
visit because they voluntarily turn that information over to third parties).
165. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
166. See, e.g., Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489,
506-10 (2012) (“Smith remains strong as applied to information analogous to
numbers dialed . . . .”).
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subscribers should know that their telephone providers have
the facilities for recording that information. Just as in 1979,
telephone subscribers should know that their telephone
provider would record that information for business
purposes. Where, as here, telephone subscribers should
reasonably know their telephone providers will record this
information in the ordinary course of business, they cannot
legitimately expect privacy. And, where there is no
subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy, no Fourth
Amendment search has occurred. And, where one individual
does not have a Fourth Amendment interest, grouping
together numerous similarly situated individuals will not
create a Fourth Amendment interest “ex nihilo.”167
However, in today’s digital age, it would be nearly
impossible for an individual to enjoy use of their cell phone
without needing to go through a third-party cell phone
provider. Furthermore, in today’s digital age, it would be
foolhardy to suggest that an individual forego use of his cell
phone in order to retain protection under the Fourth
Amendment. Cell phones are more than just casual means of
communication: they are maps, music players, business
planners, and cameras. While Supreme Court precedent
demands the result that cell phone users relinquish Fourth
Amendment protection in their telephony metadata through
use of a cell phone provider, this result only serves to
underscore the outdated state of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In Clapper, the court refused to ignore the important
national security interest in fighting terrorism and dismantle
a vital tool for identifying terrorist threats. In Clapper, the
court refused to substitute its own judgment for that of the
at least fifteen FISC judges who concluded the Program was
lawful on at least fifteen occasions.168 In Clapper, the court
refused to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent and

167. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from [REDACTED], Docket No. BR 13-109, at 9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
168. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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predict whether the Supreme Court would later overrule a
precedent.
In light of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
Clapper was correctly decided. However, what Clapper
demonstrates, more than anything, is the need to revisit
Fourth Amendment protection in light of changing
technology. Intervention—whether by the Supreme Court,
Congress, or the Executive itself—is needed. Until then,
some peace of mind can be found in the fact that the Program
concerns contentless information. As previously explained,
the Program only obtains the ten-digit telephone numbers on
the dialing and receiving ends of a call, when the call
occurred, and how long the call lasted. There is no identifying
or locational information collected by the Program. And, in
order to use the information collected to achieve such a goal,
additional legal and investigative moves would need to be
taken by the FBI or other investigating agency. In light of
these additional—and heavily restricted—steps, it appears
impossible for the Program to create a “record of a person’s
public movements” that is detailed enough to reveal intimate
details of a person’s life.169
Only time will tell if the Supreme Court will step in and
settle the debate, if Congress will change the laws upon
which the Program is grounded, or if the Executive will alter
the Program to increase oversight and transparency. Until
then, Clapper should be limited to its facts and must not be
extended to other types of intelligence surveillance, such as
those that would include content information.

169. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

